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We consider the problem of achieving exact consensus with Byzantine faults under a
local-broadcast communication channel. We prove necessary and sufficient conditions on
the underlying communication graph to achieve consensus. We show that under this model
consensus is possible on undirected graphs that have 2f + 1 nodes and are 2f -connected.
In contrast, it is well known that with point-to-point links, achieving consensus requires at
least 3f + 1 nodes and 2f + 1 connectivity. We show a tight result for the case of a single
fault, by proving that consensus is impossible on any undirected graph that has at most 1
connectivity, and providing an algorithm for 2-connected graphs with at least 3 nodes. We
give another algorithm for achieving consensus with at most f faulty nodes, on arbitrary
undirected graphs with 2f connectivity and 2f + 1 nodes. Additionally, we prove that
consensus is impossible on any graph with connectivity less than f + 1. We also show some
necessity results for directed graphs. Finally, we present an example network that suggests
that connectivity less than 2f may be sufficient in general.
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Chapter 1: Introduction
We consider the problem of achieving exact Byzantine consensus in a synchronous system
under a local-broadcast channel. By local-broadcast we mean that whenever a node sends a
message, it is received by all of its outgoing neighbors. This model is motivated by wireless
networks. Up to f of the nodes may deviate from the algorithm and behave in an arbitrary
manner. We prove necessary and sufficient conditions on the underlying communication
graph to achieve exact consensus in this model. Under the point-to-point model, it is known
that 2f + 1 connectivity and 3f + 1 nodes are both necessary and sufficient to achieve con-
sensus in undirected graphs with up to f Byzantine faulty nodes [1]. Under the assumption
of non-equivocation, which means that faulty nodes are not allowed to send conflicting mes-
sages to different nodes, consensus can be solved with point-to-point links on a complete
graph with 2f + 1 nodes [2]. Because of a local-broadcast channel, our model allows us to
not only achieve non-equivocation, but furthermore, it also allows neighbors to detect when
a faulty node tampers a message before forwarding it. We show that 2f connectivity and
2f + 1 nodes are sufficient for achieving consensus in undirected graphs under this model,
if the nodes have binary-valued inputs. An algorithm for the special case of a single faulty
node (i.e f = 1) is given in Chapter 3. Chapter 4 extends this to arbitrary values of
f . Both algorithms assume undirected graphs and FIFO links. Chapter 2 describes some
necessary conditions on the communication graphs. These results do not make the same
assumptions.
1.1 RELATED WORK
The problem of consensus has been studied under many different assumptions and fault-
models. Fischer et al. proved that under f Byzantine faults with point-to-point links,
consensus is impossible on any undirected graph that has less than 3f + 1 nodes or is at
most 2f -connected [1]. The problem of consensus on directed graphs was studied by Tseng
et al. [3], who showed necessary and sufficiency results for achieving crash-tolerant and
Byzantine consensus on directed graphs. Some of the lemmas and notation in Chapter 3
are motivated by their results. Byzantine consensus using partial authentication is studied
in [4]. [5] discussed the problem of reliable global broadcast in radio networks. The model
is similar to ours, in that a message sent by a node is received by all neighbors, but we
discuss the problem of Byzantine consensus. Solving approximate consensus under malicious
faults using iterative algorithms is discussed in [6]. Malicious faulty nodes are defined as
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nodes that can update their state arbitrarily. This fault-model is also similar to our model,
because malicious faulty nodes cannot send different values to different neighbors, a property
we achieve by using a local-broadcast channel. The property of not sending conflicting
messages to different neighbors is called non-equivocation in the literature. Consensus with
non-equivocation is also studied in [7], but in the context of (2, 3) uniform hypergraphs,
i.e hypergraphs having edges of size 2 and 3 only. [8] shows bounds on the number of 3-
hyperedges required to achieve consensus. [9] studies the problem of iterative approximate
Byzantine consensus using 3-hyperedges in which a unique sender is identified. [10] studies
asynchronous multiparty computation under non-equivocation. [2] discusses asynchronous
Byzantine consensus with non-equivocation and transferable authentication.
1.2 SYSTEM MODEL
Formally, we model the communication network using a graph G = (V,E), such that there
is an edge from node u to node v, if node v can receive messages from node u. Each node
has a binary input value. Each node u maintains a variable du, that indicates the “decision”
of u. When a node sets du to a non-null value b, it is said to “decide” the value b. We
assume that communication is synchronous and that any time a node u sends a message,
it is received by all outgoing neighbors of u. We will also assume that nodes receive their
own messages. Furthermore, when a node u receives a message from a neighbor node, it can
identify the neighbor that sent the message. The links are assumed to be FIFO. Up to f of
the nodes in the graph are allowed to be Byzantine faulty. A faulty node is assumed to have
complete knowledge of the states of all the nodes, the algorithm, and the network topology.
An algorithm is said to achieve consensus on graph G, if the following conditions hold
• Termination : The algorithm terminates after a bounded number of steps.
• Agreement : When the algorithm terminates, all non-faulty nodes decide the same
value d.
• Validity : If the input value of all the non-faulty nodes is b, then when the algorithm
terminates, all non-faulty nodes decide b.
Solving consensus when the graph has only one node is trivial. Hence, we will assume
that |V | ≥ 2.
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Chapter 2: Some Necessity Results
In this chapter, we discuss necessary conditions on the communication graphs of networks
that allow for exact consensus under f faulty nodes. The arguments are similar in flavor to
necessity arguments for Byzantine faults with point-to-point links, but they are complicated
by the fact that we have a local-broadcast channel. So that when faulty nodes deviate
from the algorithm, non-faulty nodes may realize this and update their state accordingly.
These nodes may also tell other nodes about the faulty nodes. So arguments that work
for the point-to-point model do not necessarily apply here. The strategy is to have faulty
nodes behave as a non-faulty node would under a different execution, so that without
sufficient connectivity constraints, it may be impossible for some subset A of the nodes to
distinguish between faulty and non-faulty nodes. Nodes in A then have to decide a value
with incomplete information about the rest of the nodes. We exploit this fact to establish
constraints on the communication graph.
Let G = (V,E) be a directed graph and let A,B be two disjoint subsets of V . We
will use the notation A− to denote the incoming neighbors of set A, outside of A. That is,
A− = {(b, a) : a ∈ A, b ∈ V − A}. Similarly we will use the notation B x⇒ A to denote that
there are at least x incoming neighbors of A in B. That is, |A− ∩ B| ≥ x. When this is
not the case, we will write B
x
6⇒ A. This notation is adopted from [3]. Then we have the
following result.
Lemma 2.1. In a synchronous system with up to f faulty nodes, in any partition L,C,R
of the nodes, where L and R are non-empty, either L ∪ C f+1⇒ R or R ∪ C f+1⇒ L
Proof. The proof is by contradiction. Suppose there exists a partition L,C,R of the
communication graph such that neither L ∪ C f+1⇒ R nor R ∪ C f+1⇒ L, but there is an
algorithm A that achieves consensus on this graph. Consider the following executions of
algorithm A
E1 : Suppose all the nodes in L have input 1 and all nodes in C and R have input
0. Suppose all nodes are non-faulty. Since we have assumed that consensus is achievable
and this is a deterministic system, there is a fixed value v ∈ {0, 1} that all the nodes decide
on.
E2 : Suppose all non-faulty nodes have input 0 and the nodes in R
− ∩ (L ∪ C) are
faulty. Note that this is possible since L ∪ C
f+1
6⇒ R. These faulty neighbors of R send the
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same messages to R as in E1. The input value of nodes in R is also the same as in E1, so
E2 and E1 are indistinguishable to nodes in R. Hence, nodes in R must decide v in E2 as well.
E3 : Suppose all non-faulty nodes have input 1 and the nodes in L
− ∩ (R ∪ C) are
faulty. Again, this is possible since R ∪C
f+1
6⇒ L. These faulty neighbors of L send the same
messages to L as in E1. The input value of nodes in L is also the same as in the E1, so
E3 and E1 are indistinguishable to nodes in L. Hence, nodes in L must decide v in E3 as well.
Note that the validity constraint in E2 implies that v should be 0, and the validity
constraint in E3 implies that v should be 1. Since v can not be both these values, we
conclude that consensus is impossible in E1.
Corollary 2.2. If there are f faulty nodes, then consensus is impossible for any undirected
graph that is not at least (f + 1)-connected.
Proof. Consider a graph G that is not (f + 1)-connected. Then, by definition, there exists
a set C ⊆ V of size at most f whose removal disconnects the graph. Let L and R be two
components of the disconnected graph. Then, since |C| ≤ f , L ∪ C
f+1
6⇒ R and R ∪ C
f+1
6⇒ L.
Hence, by Lemma 2.1, consensus is impossible on graph G.
Next we will prove that this condition is not sufficient to achieve consensus in the presence
of f faulty nodes. This is because even with local-broadcast, each node must have at least
2f incoming neighbors to achieve consensus. The overall idea for this is as follows. Suppose
there is a node u with at most 2f−1 neighbors v1 . . . v2f−1. Consider an execution in which u
has input value 0 and every other non-faulty node has input value 1. Suppose v1 . . . vf−1 are
faulty and behave as if everyone has input value 0. u should not be able to distinguish this
execution from an execution where every non-faulty node had input value 0 and vf . . . v2f−1
were faulty. Hence, u must decide on 0, and in order to achieve agreement, every non-faulty
node must decide on 0. But now consider an execution with exactly the same messages,
except that u was also a faulty node (in addition to v1 . . . v2f−1). The decision in this
execution would also be 0, which violates validity. A formal proof is given below.
Lemma 2.3. In any synchronous system that achieves consensus while tolerating up to f
faulty nodes, each node must have 2f incoming neighbors.
Proof. The proof is by contradiction. Suppose there is an algorithm A that solves consensus
on a directed graph G = (V,E) that has a node u with less than 2f incoming edges. Let
4
the incoming neighbors of u be v1 . . . vf−1, vf . . . v2f−1. We will construct three executions,
E1, E2, E3.
E1 : In execution E1, v1 . . . vf−1 are faulty nodes. u has input 0 and all other non-
faulty nodes have input 1. The behavior of the faulty nodes is as follows. The faulty nodes
run a simulation E2 of algorithm A on a graph G
′. If v was a node in graph G, then we
will denote the corresponding node in G′ as v′. In the simulation every non-faulty node
has input 0, and nodes v′f . . . v
′
2f−1 are faulty. In E1 (the actual execution) whenever a
node vk ∈ vf . . . v2f−1 sends a message, the faulty node in the simulation, v′k sends the same
message. Note that this is possible since v′k is a faulty node and it can send any arbitrary
message. In E2 (the simulated execution) whenever a node v
′
k ∈ v′1 . . . v′f−1 sends a message,
the faulty node vk in E1 sends the same message. Again this is possible since vk is a faulty
node in E1. Let the decision in E1 be d.
E2 : Execution E2 is the simulated execution defined above. Note that this is a
valid execution, since every non-faulty node is running algorithm A. Also recall that in
E2, all non-faulty nodes had input 0. Node u receives the same messages from each of
its neighbors in both the executions. Hence, u’s decision would be the same in both the
execution. By the validity constraint in E2, we have d = 0.
E3 : In execution E3, in addition to v1 . . . vf−1, u is also a faulty node. All non-
faulty nodes have inputs 1. Node u behaves exactly the same as in E1. The faulty nodes,
v1 . . . vf−1, also behave the same way as in E1. Hence, the messages received by any
non-faulty node remain the same as in E1. The inputs of the non-faulty nodes are also the
same as in E1. By the validity constraint in E3, the decision should be 1.
Since E1 and E2 are indistinguishable to node u, by the validity condition in E2, we
have that the decision in E1 has to be 0. However execution E3 and execution E1 are
indistinguishable to all the other non-faulty nodes. By the validity condition in E3, we have
that the decision in E1 has to be 1. Both these statements can not be true. Hence, we
conclude that consensus is impossible on the graph G.
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Chapter 3: A Tight Bound for f=1
In this chapter, we will describe the necessary and sufficient conditions for achieving
consensus on an undirected graph in the case of a single fault. From Corollary 2.2, we
know that for f = 1, consensus is impossible on any graph that is not 2-connected. Here
we will prove that this bound is tight. That is, consensus is achievable on any arbitrary
2-connected, undirected graph, with at least 3 nodes. The proof is constructive, and an
algorithm for achieving consensus in this case is given below.
3.1 ALGORITHM (FOR F=1)
Intuitively, the algorithm works as follows. Initially, each node only knows its own input
value. Then nodes alternate between exchanging the sets of values they know and reporting
faulty behavior. The key idea here is that the local-broadcast channel allows some of the
faulty behavior to be detected by certain nodes. Specifically, if the faulty node w tampers
a message before forwarding it, the neighbor u who sent w that message can observe the
tampering, because of the local-broadcast channel. Node u can then help other nodes learn
that node w is faulty. Narrowing down the list of potentially faulty nodes helps, because
a node u can trust a message it receives over a path that it knows does not contain the
faulty node. If node u does not know anything about which node might be faulty, then u
needs to receive the message over f + 1 = 2 node disjoint paths to be able to trust the
message. Similarly, if u sends a message to v along path P , and the faulty node w tampers
this message, then the neighbor x of w, who forwarded u’s message to w, can observe the
tampering and relay this information back to u, along path P . So node u can learn that the
faulty node must be on the subpath of P from w to u. Since nodes u and v have at least
two disjoint paths, P and Q, between them, if u’s message to v is tampered along path P ,
then u learns that path Q from v to u is fault-free. Hence, we can at least establish reliable
communication in one direction. This helps because now node v can tell node u its state.
Details of the algorithm are given below.
Recall that G = (V,E) is the underlying, undirected communication graph. We will
assume that |V | = n ≥ 3 and that G is 2-connected. Each node u ∈ V keeps the following
state
• An array valu to store the input values of nodes in the graph. Initially, valu[u] is set
to the input value of node u and all other elements of valu are set to the null value,
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⊥. We will say that node u knows the input value of node v, if valu[v] 6= ⊥.
• A set Fu of nodes that are potentially faulty from u’s viewpoint. Fu is initialized to
V − {u}.
• A set Iu of node ids. If a node v is in the set Iu and node u receives any message m
originated by v, then node u does not use m in updating its state. This will be clarified
again later. Iu is initialized to be the empty set.
• An array K[u], where K[u][v] is the set of nodes whose input value may be known to
node v, from u’s perspective. InitiallyK[u][u] = {u}, and for all v 6= u, u optimistically
sets K[u][v] = V . We will use the shorthand Ku for K[u][u].
Definition 3.1. We will use the phrase “node u reliably receives a message m from node v”
if any of the following conditions hold
• u receives message m directly from a neighbor node v (i.e (u, v) ∈ E).
• u identically receives message m sent by v through f + 1 = 2 node-disjoint paths.
• u receives a message from v through a path disjoint with Fu.
Flooding
When a node u wants to flood a message m, it sends the pair (m, []) to all of its neighbors,
and we say that u originates the message m. m is the actual content of the message and the
second element represents the path the message has travelled on so far ([] denotes the empty
path). If nodes u and v are neighbors, then when u sends a message (m,P ), we will assume
v receives the message (m,P + [u]). Since a node can identify which of its neighbors sent
the message, this is acheiveable by having node v append u on to the path P . Whenever
a node v receives (m, path) from a node u for the first time1, then v possibly updates its
own state (valv, Fv and K[v]) and then forwards (m, path) to the rest of its neighbors
2.
Any received message (m,P ), where the length of the path P is greater than the number of
nodes is discarded. These rules ensure that the flooding process terminates after a bounded
number of steps. Otherwise, the faulty node could keep sending bogus messages and cause
the flooding process to never terminate.
1If two or more messages are received in a given round with the same path, then only the first message
received is forwarded.
2When the distinction between originating a message and forwarding is not important, we will use the
term, sends, to refer to both acts.
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Note that although the path part of the message is an array, we will also treat it as a set
whenever it is convenient.
The algorithm proceeds in phases. In phase 0, nodes flood their input values. If the faulty
node tampers some of the messages, then not all the nodes will reliably receive all the values.
Phase 1 has two parts. In phase 1.1, nodes try to propagate the values they know to other
nodes by flooding their val array. Again, not all of these values will be reliably received. So
in phase 1.2, nodes that know which node is faulty try to tell this to other nodes. Phase 1
is repeated n(n− 1)+1 times. Each iteration of Phase 1 is called a round of Phase 1, which
consists of a round of phase 1.1 and a round of phase 1.2. Finally in the decision phase, the
nodes decide on a common value, based on the information collected in the previous phases.
We now describe the algorithm for an arbitrary node u.
Phase 0
• Node u floods its own input value a, and sets valu[u] = a.
• If u reliably receives a value b from a node v, then u sets valu[v] = b.
• If a neighbor w of u receives a message from u and forwards it incorrectly (i.e. w
tampers the message before forwarding, or does not forward it at all), then u sets
Fu = {w}.
We will assume that all nodes send their input values in phase 0. Since there could be a
faulty node in the graph, this property is not guaranteed. However, it can be acheived by
having the neighbors of the faulty node assume a default value in case they do not receive
a message from a faulty node.
Phase 1 is repeated n(n− 1) + 1 times.
Phase 1
• Phase 1.1
– Node u floods valu.
– If a neighbor w of u receives a message from u and forwards it incorrectly, then
u sets Fu = {w}.
• Phase 1.2
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1. If Fu is a singleton {w}, then u floods a message saying that node w is faulty.
If node u receives a message (m,P ), saying that node v is faulty, then u sets
Fu = Fu ∩ (P ∪ {v}). Recall P is the alleged path that the message travelled on,
before it reached u.
2. If a neighbor w of u receives a message from u during flooding and forwards it
incorrectly, then u sets Fu = {w}.
3. For a node v /∈ (Fu ∪ Iu), if u reliably received valv in phase 1.1 (with respect to
the current value of Fu), then u sets K[u][v] = {x | valv[x] 6= ⊥}, and “merges”
valu and valv. That is, for all x such that valu[x] = ⊥, u sets valu[x] = valv[x].
4. For a node v /∈ (Fu ∪ Iu), if u did not reliably received valv in phase 1.1 (with
respect to the current value of Fu), then u sets Iu = Iu ∪ {v}.
5. Node u sets Iu = Iu ∪ Fu
6. Finally, node u sets K[u][u] = {x | valu[x] 6= ⊥}, and for any node v ∈ Iu, u sets
K[u][v] = V .
Decision Phase
Node u computes the “decision set”, Du = ∩v∈(V−Fu)K[u][v]. Consider the multi-set
S = {valu[i] | i ∈ Du} of values of the nodes in the decision set. Note that S cannot contain
⊥, since Du ⊆ K[u][u]. Node u decides the majority value (the value that appears most
frequently) in S. If there is a tie, then 0 is chosen as the decision value (recall that the
inputs are binary).
3.2 CORRECTNESS
The algorithm described above trivially satisfies termination, since the algorithm runs a
bounded number of steps.
Proving validity and agreement needs more work. Through the lemmas below, we will prove
that (a) the decision set for each node is non-empty, (b) each node computes the same
decision set, and (c) the computed decision set contains at least 2f + 1 = 3 elements.
When talking about a path subgraph P of G, we will use the notation [u, v]P to de-
note the path between node u and v (including u and v) in P . If the end points are not
included, then we will denote this by parentheses, e.g (u, v]P or [u, v)P , or (u, v)P . As an
example if P = a− b− c− d− e, then
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(a, c)P = b (3.1)
[a, c)P = a− b (3.2)
[a, c]P = a− b− c (3.3)
Definition 3.2. We will say that “node u knows a fault-free uv path” at a certain time, if
there is a uv path that is disjoint with Fu at that time.
The decision set can be thought of as computing the minimum information that is known
to all the non-faulty nodes. The idea is that if all the nodes decide based on that information,
then they will agree on the same value. Note that in computing Du, node u considers only
nodes that are not in Fu. Hence, we first need to prove that if w is a faulty node, then in
the decision phase, w is still a member of Fu.
Lemma 3.3. If w is the faulty node, then for any non-faulty node v, w remains in Fv until
the algorithm terminates.
Proof. Consider a non-faulty node v. We will prove the claim by induction on the number of
updates made to Fv. The base case (0 updates) is trivial, since at the start of the algorithm,
Fv = V − {v}. Since by assumption v is non-faulty, if there is a faulty node w, then
w ∈ V − {v} = Fv.
Now let us assume that after k updates to Fv (for some k ∈ N), w ∈ Fv. For the (k + 1)th
update to Fv there are two cases, we will prove correctness for both of them.
• When u is a neighbor of v and u does not correctly forward a message received from v
: Since all messages are sent by flooding, if v sends a message to u which it expects to
be forwarded and u does not forward this message correctly, then u must be a faulty
node. Since we are assuming there is only one faulty node, we have u = w. Hence, the
(k + 1)-th update, Fv = {u}, is correct.
• v receives a message (m,P ) that says u is faulty : There are two cases, either the
faulty node w is on path P or it is not. In the first case the faulty node is in P , and
in the second case the faulty node must be u, i.e. u = w. This is because P does not
contain any faulty nodes, so a non-faulty node x must have originated the message m.
A non-faulty node x only originates such a message if u is a neighbor of x and does
not correctly forward a message received from x’s. As argued previously, u must be
the faulty node in this case.
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Therefore, in either case, the faulty node w is in the set P ∪ {u}. Furthermore, by
the induction hypothesis we have, w ∈ Fv. Hence, the (k + 1)-th update, Fv =
Fv ∩ (P ∪ {u}), is correct.
Hence, after the (k + 1)th update, we still have w ∈ Fv.
Our next two results show how the local-broadcast model helps in narrowing down the
list of possibly faulty nodes and figuring out fault-free paths.
Lemma 3.4. If node w is faulty and it tampers a message (before forwarding it) in phase
0, then at the end of the first round of phase 1, for any two non-faulty nodes u, v, at least
one of the following three conditions is true.
• u knows that v is non-faulty (i.e. v /∈ Fu) and knows a fault-free uv path.
• v knows that u is non-faulty (i.e. u /∈ Fv) and knows a fault-free uv path.
• u knows that v is non-faulty and v knows that u is non-faulty (i.e. v /∈ Fu and u /∈ Fv).
Proof. Suppose that the faulty node w tampers a message it received from a neighbor x in
phase 0. Note that since there is only one faulty node (i.e. f = 1), x must be non-faulty.
Hence, by the end of phase 0, we will have Fx = {w}. By Lemma 3.3, w remains in set Fx
in the first round of phase 1.2. Furthermore, since no rule for updating the set Fx makes
the set larger, in the first round of phase 1.2, we still have, Fx = {w}. Therefore, in round
1 of phase 1.2, x sends a message saying that w is faulty. Now consider any two non-faulty
nodes u, v. Since the graph is 2-connected, either u and v must be neighbors, or there must
be two internally disjoint paths between u and v [11]. In either case, there must be one uv
path, P , that does not contain the faulty node w. Again, because the graph is 2-connected,
there is a path, Px that starts at x, terminates at a node in P , and does not include w.
Consider the first node y on Px that is also in P (it is possible that x = y). Let P
′ be the
sub-path of [x, y)Px . We consider three cases.
• If y = u : In this case, u receives a message from x along path P ′ that says node w is
faulty. Therefore, u sets Fu = Fu ∩ (P ′ ∪{w}). Since (P ′ ∪{w})∩ (u, v]P = ∅, we have
Fu ∩ (u, v]P = ∅. Hence, u learns that v is non-faulty and that path P is a fault-free
uv path.
• If y = v : Similar to the above case, here v learns that u is non-faulty and that path
P is a fault-free uv path.
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• If y 6= u and y 6= v : In this case, u receives a message from path [y, u)P ∪ P ′ saying
that w is faulty, and v receives a message from path [y, v)P ∪P ′ saying that w is faulty.
Note that u and v are the end-points of P , and by construction P ∩ P ′ = ∅. Hence,
v /∈ [y, u)P ∪P ′ and u /∈ [y, v)P ∪P ′. Therefore both u and v learn that the other node
is non-faulty.















Figure 3.1: Possible paths from node x
Let valu,r denote the state of the array valu at the end of round r of phase 1, and valu,0 be
the state of valu at the end of phase 0. Analogously define Iv,r, Fv,r, Ku,r and K[u][v]r.
Lemma 3.5. Suppose there is a faulty node w that tampers a message in phase 0. Let u, v
be two non-faulty nodes and suppose there exists a smallest integer r, such that v ∈ Iu,r.
Then the following three conditions hold.
• u /∈ Fv,r
• There is a uv path Q, such that Q ∩ Fv,r = ∅
• For all rounds 1 ≤ r′ ≤ n(n− 1) + 1 of phase 1, u /∈ Iv,r′.
Proof. We consider two cases.
• If v ∈ Fu,r : Note that since there are no rules for updating Fu that make the set
larger, if v ∈ Fu,r, then v ∈ Fu,1. Hence, by Lemma 3.4, u /∈ Fv,1 and there is a uv
path Q, such that Q ∩ Fv,1 = ∅. Again, since there are no rules that make the set Fv
larger, therefore, u /∈ Fv,r and Q∩Fv,r = ∅. Hence, for all rounds 1 ≤ r′ ≤ n(n−1)+1,
v reliably receives valu,r′−1 from u, and u /∈ Iv,r′ .
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• If v /∈ Fu,r : In this case, since r is the smallest integer such that v ∈ Iu,r, then it
must be the case that u does not reliably receive valv,r−1 in round r of phase 1. This
means, u receives conflicting messages from v on two disjoint paths P and Q in round
r of phase 1.1. WLOG suppose w is on path P and tampers the message sent by v.
In this case v receives a message from a subpath (w, v)P of P in round r of phase
1.2, saying that w is faulty. Hence, v sets Fv,r = Fv,r ∩ ({w} ∪ (w, v)P ) and therefore
u /∈ Fv,r, and Fv,r ∩ Q = ∅. So what is left to show is that u /∈ Iv,r′ for any round
1 ≤ r′ ≤ n(n− 1) + 1.
Since there are no rules for updating the set Fv that make the set larger, we have
u /∈ Fv,r′ and Fv,r′ ∩Q = ∅, for any round r′ ≥ r, and hence v reliably receives valu,r′−1
along path Q in round r′.
Furthermore, u /∈ Fv,1, because otherwise by Lemma 3.4, v /∈ Fu,1 and u knows a fault-
free path from v, which means u reliably receives valv,r−1 in round r, which contradicts
our assumption. Similarly if there is a round r′ < r in which v does not reliably receive
valu,r′−1, then u learns a fault-free uv path in round r
′. Therefore, again, it must be
the case that u reliably receives valv,r−1 in round r, which contradicts our assumption.
Hence, u /∈ Fv,1 and v reliably receives valu in every round of phase 1, and hence,
1 ≤ r′ ≤ n(n− 1) + 1, u /∈ Iv,r′ .
Next we need to show that the intersection Du computed by every node is non-empty. For
this we need to show that for every node u, there is a non-empty set S that is contained in
all the sets K[u][v] (where v /∈ Fu). In fact, we will show the much stronger statement that
the collection {K[u][v] | v /∈ Fu} is totally ordered by the subset relation.
We will use the shorthand Ku for K[u][u]. First we show the following lemma, which we will
need later on.
Lemma 3.6. Suppose there exists a round 1 ≤ r ≤ n(n − 1) + 1 of phase 1, such that for
all non-faulty nodes u, Ku,r = Ku,r−1. Then for any round r ≤ r′ ≤ n(n − 1) + 1, for all
non-faulty nodes u, Ku,r′ = Ku,r−1.
Proof. The statement is vacuously true if r = n(n−1)+1. So let us assume r < n(n−1)+1.
The proof is by contradiction. Suppose there exists a non-faulty node x, such that Kx,r =
Kx,r−1, but, Kx,r+1 6= Kx,r. Now if Kx,r+1 6= Kx,r, then it must be the case that x reliably
receives an array valy,r from some node y /∈ (Ix,r ∪ Fu,r+1), such that Ky,r ⊃ Kx,r. Suppose
such a node y exists. Since y /∈ Fu,r+1, by Lemma 3.3, y is non-faulty. By assumption, we
have Ky,r = Ky,r−1, and Kx,r = Kx,r−1. Hence if Ky,r ⊃ Kx,r, then Ky,r−1 ⊃ Kx,r−1. Since
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Kx,r = Kx,r−1, this means that either x did not reliably receive valy,r−1 in round r, or that
node y was in the set (Ix,r−1 ∪ Fu,r). In either case, node y must be in the set Ix,r. This
contradicts our assumption that node y /∈ (Ix,r ∪ Fu,r+1). Therefore, Kx,r+1 = Kx,r, and
since x was an arbitrary non-faulty node, we have Ku,r+1 = Ku for all non-faulty nodes u.
We can now repeat this argument inductively for any round r′ ≥ r. Hence for any round
r′ ≥ r, for all non-faulty nodes u, Ku,r′ = Ku,r−1.
Lemma 3.7 (Containment Property). At the end of phase 1, for every pair u, v of non-
faulty nodes, Ku and Kv are comparable under the subset relation. That is, we have either
(Ku ⊆ Kv) or (Kv ⊆ Ku).
Proof. Let u, v be any non-faulty nodes. If no messages are tampered in phase 0, then the
lemma is trivially true, since in that case all nodes reliably receive all the input values, and
by the end of phase 0, we have Ku = Kv = V . Since no rule for updating the sets Ku and
Kv make them smaller, we have, Ku = Kv = V , at the end of phase 1.
Hence, we will assume that the faulty node w tampers some message in phase 0. Let |valu,r|
denote the number of non-null values in valu,r, i.e. |valu,r| = |{v | valu,r[v] 6= ⊥}|. We will
say that a node u “learns” a new value in round r of phase 1 if |valu,r| > |valu,r−1|. In any
given round of phase 1, either there is some node that learns a new value, or no node learns
any new value. We will prove the following implication :
∃r ∀u ∈ V − {w} valu,r = valu,r−1
⇒ ∀r − 1 ≤ r′ ≤ n(n− 1) + 1 ∀u, v ∈ V − {w} Ku,r′ ⊆ Kv,r′ ∨Kv,r′ ⊆ Ku,r′
(3.4)
That is, if no non-faulty node learns a new value in a round r, then the containment
property holds in all subsequent rounds.
So let us suppose there is a round r ≥ 1 in which no node learns any new value. Consider
any pair of non-faulty nodes u, v. Then either v ∈ Iu,r or v /∈ Iu,r. We consider both cases.
• v ∈ Iu,r : In this case, by Lemma 3.5, u /∈ (Iv,r−1 ∪ Fv,r), and v knows a uv path
disjoint with Fv,r. Hence v reliably receives valu,r−1 and merges it with valv,r−1. Since
Kv,r = Kv,r−1, it must be the case that Ku,r−1 ⊆ Kv,r−1.
• v /∈ Iu,r : Then it must be the case that v /∈ (Fu,r ∪ Iu,r−1), and u reliably receives
valv,r−1, because otherwise, by the update rules of phase 1.2, v would be in the set
Iu,r. Since Ku,r = Ku,r−1, it must be the case that Kv,r−1 ⊆ Ku,r−1.
Let x be any arbitrary non-faulty node. By Lemma 3.6, we have Kx,r′ = Kx,r−1 for any
round r′ ≥ r. Hence, the containment property also holds in every round r′ ≥ r − 1.
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Since any node can learn at most (n − 1) additional values, either all nodes learn all the
values, in which case Ku = Kv = V , for any non-faulty nodes u, v, or there is a round r
in which no node learns a new value. In either case, the containment property holds after
n(n− 1) rounds of phase 1.2.
Lemma 3.8. Let u, v be two non-faulty nodes. In the decision phase, if Ku ⊂ Kv, then the
following conditions hold.
• K[v][u] = Ku
• u /∈ Fv
• K[u][v] = V .
Proof. By Lemma 3.7, we know that at the end of phase 1 the containment property holds.
If Ku ⊂ Kv, then it must be the case that the faulty node w tampers a message in phase
0 and that there is a round r of phase 1, in which no node learns a new value. Because
otherwise, Ku = Kv = V for all non-faulty nodes u, v. By Lemma 3.6, for any non-faulty
node x, Kx,n(n−1)+1 = Kx,r′−1 for any round r
′ ≥ r. In particular, Kx,n(n−1)+1 = Kx,n(n−1).
Note that the state of the variable Ku in the decision phase equals Ku,n(n−1)+1. Therefore, in
the decision phase, if Ku ⊂ Kv, then Ku,n(n−1) ⊂ Kv,n(n−1). This must mean that in round
n(n− 1) + 1, node u either did not reliably receive valv,n(n−1) or that node v was in the set
(Iu,n(n−1) ∪Fu,n(n−1)+1). In either case, by the update rules in phase 1.2, node v is in the set
Iu,n(n−1)+1. Hence, by Lemma 3.5, u /∈ Iv,n(n−1)+1 and in round n(n − 1) + 1 of phase 1, v
knows a fault-free uv path Q. Hence, v reliably receives Ku,n(n−1) and sets K[v][u]n(n−1)+1 =
Ku,n(n−1) = Ku,n(n−1)+1. Also, since v ∈ Iu,n(n−1)+1, u sets K[u][v]n(n−1)+1 = V .
Corollary 3.9. In the decision phase, for any non-faulty nodes u, v, either K[u][v] = V or
K[u][v] = Kv.
Proof. By Lemma 3.8, this is true if in the decision phase Ku ⊂ Kv or Kv ⊂ Ku. Hence,
we only need to prove the argument when Ku = Kv. Note that since there are n(n− 1) + 1
rounds of phase 1, no node learns a new value in round n(n − 1) + 1 of phase 1. This is
because each node can learn at most (n − 1) values. So either all nodes learn all values by
the end of round n(n − 1) or there is a round 1 ≤ r ≤ n(n − 1), in which no node learns a
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new value. In either case, by Lemma 3.6, no node learns a new value in round n(n− 1)+ 1
of phase 1. Now either v ∈ Iu,n(n−1)+1, or v /∈ (Fu,n(n−1)+1 ∪ Iu,n(n−1)) and u reliably receives
valv,n(n−1) = valv,(n−1)+1 in round n(n − 1) + 1. In the first case, then u sets K[u][v] = V ,
and in the second case, u sets K[u][v] = Kv,n(n−1) = Kv,n(n−1)+1.
Next, we will prove that updates to the val array are correct. That is, if u, x are non-faulty
nodes, and valu[x] = b, then the input value of node x is b. Otherwise, if x is faulty, then
for any non-faulty nodes u, v, valu[x] = valv[x]. So that all non-faulty nodes decide a value
from the same multi-set of values.
Lemma 3.10. Let u, v be two non-faulty nodes. For any x ∈ V , if valu[x] 6= ⊥ and
valv[x] 6= ⊥, then valu[x] = valv[x]
Proof. Suppose x is a non-faulty node and suppose valu[x] = b (for some b ∈ {0, 1}). Suppose
this value is set in phase 0. Then it must be the case that either x is a neighbor of u or
u receives this value from two internally disjoint paths P and Q. In the first case, since x
sends this value directly to u it must be that b is the input value of x. In the second case,
since the faulty node can be either in P or in Q but not both, again it must be the case
that b is the input value of x. If this value is set in round 1 of phase 1, then it must be
the case that u reliably receives valv from some non-faulty node v /∈ (Fu,0 ∪ Iu,0) such that
valv[x] 6= ⊥. Since v /∈ Fu,0, by Lemma 3.3, v must be non-faulty. This must mean that
v sets valv[x] = b in phase 0. Hence, b must be the value of node x, as argued previously.
If the valu[x] was instead set in some round r > 1 of phase 1, then we can complete the
argument by using induction on the round of phase 1. So if u, v, x are any non-faulty nodes
and valu[x] 6= ⊥ and valv[x] 6= ⊥ then it must be the case that valu[x] = valv[x] = b, where
b is the input value of x.
Suppose that x is a faulty node. Then since there is only one faulty node, if x sends a
message, there is no other faulty node to tamper this message hence every node u receives
this message through 2 internally disjoint paths. Therefore, for any non-faulty nodes u, v we
have valu[x] = valv[x] at the end of phase 0.
Finally, we are in a position to prove that our algorithm correctly achieves consensus.
Theorem 3.11. The algorithm described in Section 3.1 satisfies validity and agreement.
Proof. By Lemma 3.7, we know that the containment property holds at the start of the
decision phase. Let W be the set containing faulty nodes, i.e. if there is a faulty node w,
then W = {w}, and otherwise, W = ∅. Let u be any non-faulty node, and let Kx be the
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smallest set in {Kv | v ∈ V −W}. Then there are two cases, either Ku = Kx or Ku ⊃ Kx.
If the former is true, then we have
Du = ∩v/∈FuK[u][v] (3.5)
= K[u][u] ∩v/∈(Fu∪{u}) K[u][v] (u /∈ Fu) (3.6)
= Ku ∩v/∈(Fu∪{u}) K[u][v] (K[u][u] = Ku) (3.7)
= Ku (Ku ⊆ Kv ⊆ K[u][v] by Corollary 3.9) (3.8)
= Kx (Ku = Kx) (3.9)
Otherwise, if Ku ⊃ Kx, then
Du = ∩v/∈FuK[u][v] (3.10)
= K[u][x] ∩v/∈(Fu∪{x}) K[u][v] (By Lemma 3.8) (3.11)
= Kx ∩v/∈(Fu∪{x}) K[u][v] (By Lemma 3.8) (3.12)
= Kx (Ku ⊆ Kv ⊆ K[u][v] by Corollary 3.9) (3.13)
So all nodes compute D = Kx as the decision set. By Lemma 3.10, every non-faulty node u
computes the same the multi-set S = {valu[v] | v ∈ D} in the decision phase. Finally, since
G is 2-connected and has at least 3 nodes, every node must have at least two neighbors.
Therefore, every node knows at least three values after phase 0, its own and the values of
its neighbors, i.e. |Kx| ≥ 3, and therefore, |S| ≥ 3. Since f = 1, the decision computed as
the majority in S (with tie broken in favor of 0) necessarily equals the input of a non-faulty
node.
We showed an algorithm for achieving consensus in the case of a single fault, on any
arbitrary graph that is 2-connected, and has at least three nodes. As mentioned earlier,
in the case of point-to-point links, consensus is impossible on any graph that is at most
2f -connected. The key ideas that our proof uses is that whenever a faulty node tampers a
message, the neighbor of the faulty node can detect this tampering.
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Chapter 4: A sufficiency result for arbitrary f
In this chapter we will discuss how to extend the sufficiency results for the case where
there is more than one fault. We will show that if there are at most f faults, then consensus
is achievable on any arbitrary graph that is 2f connected. Not all results discussed in
Chapter 3 easily extend to arbitrary values of f . For example, it turns out that the kind
of arguments used in Lemma 3.4 for the case of a single fault, do not apply if there is more
than one fault. As such, we need a more complicated algorithm for the general case. Some of
our modifications are just generalizations from the single fault case, but others use different
ideas. A key observation that helps us here is that if faulty nodes tamper messages, then in
addition to the neighbor of the faulty nodes, the originator of the message can also find out
the identity of the faulty nodes. We add a new phase in the algorithm that allows this fault
detection. In the modified algorithm presented in Section 4.1, each node u keeps two sets
Fu and F
∗
u , for nodes that it thinks may be faulty and for nodes that it knows are faulty,
respectively. We will also need to redefine some of the terminology from Chapter 3.
Definition 4.1. A node u reliably receives a message m from node v, if any of the following
conditions are true.
• u and v are neighbors and v sends m.
• |F ∗u | = k and u receives message m from at least f − k+1 internally disjoint vu paths
that do not contain any node in F ∗u .
• u receives a message from v through a path disjoint to Fu.
Definition 4.2. We will say that node u receives a trusted message m, if u receives it from
f + 1 node disjoint paths (including the source node), or u itself sends the message m.
4.1 ALGORITHM
Each node u keeps the following state
• An array valu to store the input values of nodes in the graph. Initially valu[u] is set
to the input value of node u and all other elements of valu are set to the null value, ⊥
• A set Fu for the nodes that u does not know to be fault-free (i.e. nodes that are
potentially faulty from u’s viewpoint). Fu is initialized to V − {u}
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• A set F ∗u for the nodes that u knows are faulty. This is initialized to be the empty set,
∅.
• An array K[u], where K[u][u] is a subset of the nodes whose values are known to u,
and for v 6= u, K[u][v] is the set of nodes in K[v][v] from u’s perspective. We will use
the shorthand Ku for K[u][u].
Messages
Every message sent by a non-faulty node is an ordered triple, consisting of a tag, a payload,
and a path. Each message that a node u originates is of one of the following forms.
• To send its own message, u sends (inputu, valu[u], []).
• To indicate that node u received a message (tag,m, P ), u sends (recvd, (tag,m, P ), []).
• To indicate that nodes in set F ∗u are faulty, u sends (faulty, F ∗u , []).
• To send Ku, node u sends (Ksetu, Ku, []).
The only difference between a message forwarded by u and a message originated by u is in
the path part of the message.
We will assume that any received messages that are not of the above forms are discarded.




– Node u floods the message (inputu, valu[u], []).
– If node u reliably receives a message m = (inputv, b), then it sets valu[v] = b.
We will assume that all nodes send their input values in phase 0. Since there could be
faulty nodes in the graph, this property is not guaranteed. However, it can be acheived
by having the non-faulty nodes assume a default value in case they do not receive a
message from a node.
For a non-faulty node u, we will say that a “node u knows what node v sent in phase
0.1”, if for every message (tag, payload, P ) sent by v, u receives a trusted message
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(recvd, (tag, payload, P + [v])). Note that if a neighbor v of u sends a message m =
(tag, payload, P ), then in phase 0.2, u sends the message m′ = (tag, payload, P + [v]),
and hence u trivially receives the trusted message m′, Therefore, for any neighbor v of
u, node u knows what v sent in phase 0.1.
• Phase 0.2
– If node u received message (inputv, b, P ) in phase 0.1, then it floods the message
(recvd, (inputv, b, P ), []).
– If node u did not reliably receive node v’s input value in phase 0.1, then consider
a set of 2f internally disjoint paths P1 . . . P2f from v to u. Let Qi be the subpath
(v, u)Pi and let qi,1 . . . qi,li be the subsequence of nodes in Qi such that u knows
what each qi,j sent in phase 0.1. Note that on each path Qi, at least one such
node exists, because Qi terminates at a neighbor of u. Now define wi = qi,1, if
for each qi,j u receives a trusted message (recvd, (inputv, b, [v, qi,j]Pi)), and oth-
erwise let wi = qij such that j is the smallest integer for which u receives the
trusted messages (recvd, (inputv, b, [v, qi,j−1]Pi)) and (recvd, (inputv, b, [v, qi,j]Pi)).
We define wi to be qi,j in this case. Node u sets Fu = Fu ∩ {wi | 1 ≤ i ≤ 2f}.
– If node u reliably receives v’s input value b (u reliably receives its own value)
in phase 0.1, then consider a set of 2f internally disjoint paths P1 . . . P2f
from v to any node x. Let Pi be a path on which a faulty node tampers
v’s message and instead forwards valv[v]. Let Wv,x be the set containing
the first node wi on each path Pi, such that u receives the trusted message




u ∪ Wv,x. Furthermore,
if |F ∗u | = f , then u sets Fu = F ∗u .
– At the end of the round, node u goes through all the messages it received in phase
0.1 and for all messages, (inputv, b), reliably received by u, with respect to the
updated sets Fu and F
∗
u , u sets valu[v] = b.
Phase 1
• If |F ∗u | = f , then u floods (faulty, F ∗u , [])
• If |F ∗u | < f , and node u reliably receives message (faulty, F ∗v ) from a node v /∈ Fu,






• At the end of the round, node u goes through all the messages it received in phase 0.1,
and for all messages, (inputv, b), reliably received by u, with respect to the updated
sets Fu and F
∗
u , u sets valu[v] = b.
After phase 1, node u sets Ku = {v | valu[v] 6= ⊥}.
Phase 2 (Repeated n times)
• Phase 2.1
– If |F ∗u | < f , then u floods (Ksetu, Ku, []).
– If |F ∗u | < f and u reliably receives (Ksetv, Kv) from node v and Kv ⊇ Fu ∪ {u}
then, u sets K[u][v] = Kv. If u reliably receives (Ksetv, Kv) from v and Kv 6⊇
Fu ∪ {u} then u sets K[u][v] = V and sets F ∗u = F ∗u ∪ {v}. If u does not reliably
receive any message from node v with the tag Ksetv, then u sets K[u][v] = V .
• Phase 2.2
– If node u receives a message m in Phase 2.1, then u floods (recvd,m, []) in phase
2.2.
– If |F ∗u | < f , and node u reliably receives (Ksetv, Kv) (again, recall u reliably
receives its own messages) in phase 2.1, then consider a set of 2f internally disjoint
paths P1 . . . P2f from v to any node x. Let Pi be a path on which a faulty node
tampers v’s message and instead forwards some set Kv 6= Kv. Let Wv,x be the
set containing the first node wi on each path Pi, such that u receives the trusted






– If |F ∗u | < f , then u goes through all messages received in Phase 1, and if u reliably
received (faulty, F ∗v ) (with respect to the updated sets Fu and F
∗
u ) from some
node v /∈ Fu, then u sets Fu = F ∗u = F ∗v .
– Similarly, node u goes through all messages in Phase 0.1, and for all messages
(inputv, b) reliably received by u with respect to the updated sets Fu and F
∗
u , u
sets valu[v] = b.
– Finally, if |F ∗u | < f , then u sets Ku = ∩v∈VK[u][v], otherwise u sets Ku = V .
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Decision Phase
• Node u floods (Ksetu, Ku, []).
• If node u reliably receives (Ksetv, Kv) where v ∈ V − Fu then u sets K[u][v] = Kv.
If instead u does not reliably receive any message with the tag Ksetv, from a node
v ∈ V − Fu, then u sets K[u][v] = V .
• Node u sets Du = ∩v∈V−FuK[u][v] and computes the decision as described in 3.1.
4.2 CORRECTNESS
Let G = (V,E) be an arbitrary 2f -connected graph, where f ≥ 1. We will prove that
consensus is achievable on graph G.
We will use W to refer to set of faulty nodes in the graph G. Thus 0 ≤ |W | ≤ f .
Definition 4.3. For a node u, let N(u) denote the non-faulty nodes in the neighborhood of
u, i.e. N(u) = {v | (u, v) ∈ E ∧ v ∈ V −W}
Our first two lemmas show how our modified algorithm helps nodes in detecting faulty
behavior.
Lemma 4.4. If a faulty node w ∈ W sent a message m = (tag, payload,W ) in phase 0.1,
then in phase 0.2 all non-faulty nodes know that w sent m.
Proof. Let u be an arbitrary non-faulty node. If node w is a neighbor of u, then u receives
m and sends m′ = (recvd, (tag, payload, P + [w])), hence, u trivially knows what w sent
in phase 0.1. If node w is not a neighbor of u, then since we are assuming the graph, G,
is 2f -connected, w has at least 2f internally node disjoint paths to u. Take any set of 2f
internally disjoint paths, P1 . . . P2f , from w to u. Let Qi denote the subpath (w, u]Pi of Pi.
Then the paths Qi . . . Q2f are pairwise disjoint and none of them contain w. Now since there
are at mostf faulty nodes, and w is one of them, it must be the case the f + 1 of the paths
in Qi . . . Q2f start at a node in N(w). All nodes in N(w) receive m in phase 0.1, and hence
send the message m′ = (recvd, (tag, payload, P + [w])) in phase 0.2. Therefore, u receives
m′ from at least f + 1 pairwise disjoint paths in phase 0.2. Hence, by definition, u knows
that w sent message m.
Next, we prove that any updates made to the sets Fu and F
∗
u before phase 2 are correct.
That is, if v is a non-faulty node, then v is not in the set Fu, and if a node w is in the set
F ∗u , then w is a faulty node. Proving the correctness of updates made in phase 2, specifically
in phase 2.2 requires more work, and is established in Lemma 4.12.
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Lemma 4.5. Let w ∈ W be a faulty node. Then for any non-faulty node u, at any point in
the algorithm before the start of phase 2, W ⊆ Fu and F ∗u ⊆ W .
Proof. Before phase 2, the sets Fu and F
∗
u are updated in two phases, phase 0.2, phase 1.
We will prove the correctness of updates in both phases.
• Phase 0.2 : Suppose there exists a non-faulty node x such that at the end of phase
0.1, valu[x] = ⊥. Then in phase 0.2, consider any set of 2f paths P1 . . . P2f from x to
u, and let Qi be the subpath (x, u)Pi . Since u and x are non-faulty, and valu[x] = ⊥, it
must be the case that there is exactly one faulty node on f paths in Q1 . . . Q2f . Since
the labeling is arbitrary, we will assume that the faulty nodes are on paths Q1 . . . Qf .
Let qi be the first node on the path Qi for which u knows what it sent in phase 0.1.
By Lemma 4.4, all nodes y for which x does not know what y sent in phase 0.1, y
must be non-faulty. In particular, for all 1 ≤ i ≤ f , all nodes in [x, qi)Pi are non-faulty.
Suppose u receives a trusted message, (recvd, (inputx, b, [x, qi]Pi)) in phase 0.2. Note
that there is at most one faulty node on each path Pi. Therefore, if qi is faulty, then
for any other node q′i on path Qi for which node u knows what it sent in phase 0.2,
u, must reliably receive (recvd, (inputx, b, [x, qi]Pi)). Hence u correctly sets qi = wi.
Otherwise, if qi is non-faulty, and q
′
i is the first node on path Qi from which u reliably




i must be a faulty node, and x correctly sets
wi = q
′
i. So if w ∈ W is any faulty node, then w ∈ Fu ∩ {wi | 1 ≤ i ≤ 2f}.
So let us suppose that x is a node such that at the end of phase 0.1, valu[x] 6= ⊥.
Then consider any set of 2f paths P1 . . . P2f between x and some node y. Since
valu[x] 6= ⊥, it must be the case that u reliably receives the input value of x, and
hence valu[x] = valx[x]. Let pi be the first node on path Pi, such that u reliably
receives (recvd, (inputx, valx[x], [x, pi]Pi)) in phase 0.2. Since any node p
′
i for which u
does not know what p′i sent in phase 0.1 must be non-faulty, pi must be a faulty node.




u ∪W only contains faulty nodes.
• Phase 1 : The sets Fu and F ∗u are only updated in phase 1, if u reliably receives a
message (faulty, F ∗v ) from a node v /∈ Fu. If v /∈ Fu in phase 1, then v must be a non-
faulty node. Since the last update to F ∗v was made in phase 0.2, as argued previously,
F ∗v must contain only faulty nodes. Furthermore, since v is non-faulty, v must have
sent this message only if |F ∗v | = f . Therefore, the update Fu = F ∗u = F ∗v is correct.
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Lemma 4.6. Let u be an arbitrary non-faulty node, such that W ⊆ Fu and F ∗u ⊆ W . Then u
reliably receives any message sent by a faulty node w. Furthermore, if |F ∗u | ≥ 1 or |Fu| < 2f ,
then u reliably receives messages from every node x ∈ V .
Proof. We prove both claims below.
• A faulty node w sends a message m : Since G is 2f -connected, there are 2f internally
disjoint paths between w and u. Since there are at most f faulty nodes, and w is one
of them, f + 1 of the paths (say, P1 . . . Pf+1) must be disjoint to W . By assumption,
F ∗u ⊆ W . Hence, P1 . . . Pf+1 are disjoint to F ∗u . Therefore, u receives m through
f + 1 ≥ f − |F ∗u |+ 1 paths. By definition, u reliably receives m.
• A non-faulty node x sends a message and |F ∗u | ≥ 1 or |Fu| < 2f : Let us suppose that
|F ∗u | ≥ 1 and consider any arbitrary node x. Since G is 2f -connected, node there are
2f internally disjoint ux paths P1 . . . P2f . Since there are only f faulty nodes, f of
the paths in P1 . . . P2f must not contain any faulty nodes. Since labeling is arbitrary,
assume the faulty nodes are on paths Pf+1 . . . P2f . Since, by assumption F
∗
u ⊆ W , the
paths P1 . . . Pf are disjoint to F
∗
u . Hence if node x sends a message m, u receives it
identically on paths P1 . . . Pf . Since, |F ∗u | ≥ 1, we have f ≥ f − |F ∗u |+1, and hence, u
reliably receives m.
Similarly if |Fu| < 2f , then since the graph is 2f -connected, for any node x ∈ V , there
must be a ux path that is disjoint to Fu. Hence in this case too, u reliably receives
messages from every node.
Corollary 4.7. Let u be an arbitrary non-faulty node. Then u reliably receives any message
sent by a faulty node w in phases 0 and 1. Furthermore, if |F ∗u | ≥ 1 or |Fu| < 2f , then u
reliably receives messages sent by every node x ∈ V in phases 0 and 1.
Proof. This follows from Lemma 4.6 and Lemma 4.5.
Lemma 4.8 (Fault Detection). Let u ∈ V −W be a non-faulty node, and let S be the set
of non-faulty nodes that reliably receive valu[u] in phase 0.1. If S 6= V −W , then there are
necessarily f nodes in W , and every node x ∈ S learns the identity of all the faulty nodes
(i.e. |F ∗x | = f and Fx = F ∗x = W ), and knows the input values of all nodes after phase 0.2
ends.
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Proof. Suppose there exists a non-faulty node v ∈ V − W , such that v /∈ S. Since v does
not reliably receive valu[u] in phase 0.1, this means that there must be exactly 2f internally
disjoint paths P1 . . . P2f from u to v, such that there is a faulty node each on exactly f of
the paths in P1 . . . Pf that forwarded valu[u] in phase 0.1. Since the labeling is arbitrary,
we can assume that the faulty nodes are on paths P1 . . . Pf . Let wi denote the faulty node
on path Pi. Since there is exactly one faulty node on each path P1 . . . Pf , each wi on
path Pi must be the first node that forwards valu[u]. Now for any node x ∈ S, x reliably
receives u’s input value in phase 0.1, and by Lemma 4.4, x receives the trusted messages
(recvd, (inputu, valu[u], [u,wi]Pi)) in phase 0.2. Hence x sets F
∗
x = {wi | 1 ≤ i ≤ f}. Now
since |F ∗x | = f , x sets Fx = F ∗x , and by Corollary 4.7, x can reliably receive messages from
every node, and therefore, x learns the input values of all the nodes by the end of phase
0.2.
Lemma 4.9. Let u, v be two non-faulty nodes, such that v does not reliably receive valu[u]
in phase 0.1, then after phase 0.2, for any non-faulty node x, we have u /∈ Fx and |Fx| ≤ 2f .
Proof. There are two cases to consider.
1. x reliably receives valu[u] in phase 0.1 : If x reliably receives valu[u], then by
Lemma 4.8, x knows the identity of all the faulty nodes. That is, |F ∗x | = f and
Fx = F
∗
x = W . Since u is not a faulty node, by Lemma 4.5, u /∈ Fx.
2. x does not reliably receive valu[u] in phase 0.1 : If x does not reliably receive
valu[u] in phase 0.1, then consider a set of 2f paths P1 . . . P2f , and let Qi be the
subpath (u, x)Pi . By the update rules in phase 0.2, x picks a node wi on each path Qi
and sets Fx = Fx∩{wi | 1 ≤ i ≤ 2f}. Therefore, |Fx| ≤ 2f and since, by construction,
u /∈ Qi, therefore, u /∈ Fx.
Lemma 4.10. Let u, v be non-faulty nodes, such that valu[v] = ⊥ at the end of phase 0.1.
Then, for any non-faulty node x ∈ V − W , at the end of phase 1, either |F ∗x | = f , or
|Fx| = 2f .
Proof. The proof is by contradiction. Let x be a non-faulty node such that at the end of
phase 1, |F ∗x | 6= f , and Fx 6= 2f . Note that since there are no rules for updating Fx that
make the set larger, by Lemma 4.9, we have that by the end of phase 1, |Fx| ≤ 2f . By
Lemma 4.5, it is also not possible that |F ∗x | > f , since there are at most f faulty nodes.
Thus, we can conclude that at the end of phase 1, we have |F ∗x | < f and |Fx| < 2f . Now,
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since we have |F ∗x | < f , it must be the case that F ∗x is not updated in phase 1, which means
that Fx is also not updated in phase 1. So if |Fx| < 2f at the end of phase 1, then it must
be the case that |Fx| < 2f at the end of phase 0.2. But by Lemma 4.9, at the end of
phase 0.2, x knows that v is a non-faulty node, and since |Fx| < 2f in phase 1, then by





Lemma 4.8, |F ∗v | = f , hence |F ∗x | = f . This contradicts our assumption.
Let Fu,r denote the state of Fu at the end of round r of phase 2, and let Fu,0 be the state
of Fu at the end of phase 1. Analogously define F
∗
u,r and Ku,r.
Definition 4.11. We will call a non-faulty node u, an “participating node” in round r of
phase 2, if |F ∗u,r−1| < f .
Note that only participating nodes in round r of phase 2 originate a message in round r
of phase 2.1.
Lemma 4.12. Let u be an arbitrary non-faulty node. Then, for any integer 0 ≤ r ≤ n, the
following three conditions hold.
• W ⊆ Fu,r
• F ∗u,r ⊆ W
• If a non-faulty node v is a participating node in round r + 1 of phase 2, then Ku,r ⊇
(Fv,0 ∪ {v}).
Proof. The proof is by induction on r. For the base case, by Lemma 4.5, W ⊆ Fu,0 and
F ∗u,0 ⊆ W . For the third condition, we consider the following cases.
• In phase 0.1, all non-faulty nodes reliably received all input values : In this case,
Ku,0 = V . Hence, Ku,0 ⊇ (Fv,0 ∪ {v}).
• After phase 0.1 there exists nodes a non-faulty node x and faulty node y such that
valx[y] = ⊥ : This case is not possible by Corollary 4.7
• After phase 0.1, there exist non-faulty nodes x and y, such that valx[y] = ⊥ : Suppose
v /∈ Ku,0 (i.e. u does not reliably receive valv[v] in phase 0.1), then by Lemma 4.8,
|F ∗v,0| = f . Hence, by definition, v is not a participating node in round 1 of phase 2.
Since we have assumed that v is a participating node in round 1 of phase 2, v ∈ Ku,0.
Now consider any node z ∈ Fv,0. Since no rule for updating the set Fv makes it larger,
it must be the case that z is in the set Fv after phase 0.2. If z is a non-faulty node,
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then by Lemma 4.9, every non-faulty node reliably receives valz[z] in phase 0.1. If z is
faulty node, then by Corollary 4.7 u reliably receives valz[z] in phase 0.1. Therefore,
z ∈ Ku,0. Since z was an arbitrary node in Fv,0, Ku,0 ⊇ Fv,0. Since we showed in the
previous paragraph that v ∈ Ku,0, therefore, Ku,0 ⊇ (Fv,0 ∪ {u}).
For the induction hypothesis, assume that the three conditions of the lemma hold for all
rounds 0 ≤ r ≤ k (for some k < n). We consider updates made in round k + 1 of phases
2.1, 2.2 and 2.3 and show that all three conditions hold after every phase.
• Phase 2.1 : If node u is not a participating node in round k + 1 of phase 2.1, then u
does not update the sets Fu, F
∗
u and Ku. Therefore, in that case, the claim trivially
holds after round k + 1 of phase 2.1
So let us suppose that node u is a participating node in round k+1 of phase 2. By the
induction hypothesis, we have Kz,k ⊇ Fu,0 ∪ {u} for all non-faulty nodes z. Therefore,
if node u reliably receives a set Kw,k 6⊇ Fu,0 ∪ {u}, then node w must be faulty node.
Hence (Fu,k ∪ {w}) ⊆ W .
• Phase 2.2 : In phase 2.2, node u only potentially updates the set F ∗u . Correctness of
the update follows from an argument similar to the correctness of the update in phase
0.2 in the proof of Lemma 4.5.
• Phase 2.3 : In phase 2.3, u only updates Fu and F ∗u if a node v /∈ Fu,k sent a message
(faulty, F ∗v ) (with respect to the updated sets Fu and F
∗
u ) in phase 1. By the induction
hypothesis, W ⊆ Fu,k. Hence if v /∈ Fu,k, then v must be a non-faulty node. Node v
only sends such a message if |F ∗v | = f . By Lemma 4.5, F ∗v ⊆ W . Since |F ∗v | = f ,




v is correct, and the first two conditions of
the lemma hold after round k + 1 of phase 2.3.
Note that no rule for updating F ∗v makes the set smaller. Therefore, if a node v is a
participating node in round k + 2 of phase 2, then v must be a participating node in
round k + 1 of phase 2. We will show, by contradiction, that Ku,k+1 ⊇ (Fv,0 ∪ {v}).
Suppose Ku,k+1 6⊇ (Fv,0 ∪ {v}). By the induction hypothesis, Kx,k ⊇ (Fv,0 ∪ {v}), for
all non-faulty nodes x. Hence, if Ku,k+1 6⊇ (Fv,0 ∪ {v}), then |F ∗u,k+1| < f , u sets
Ku,k+1 = ∩x∈VK[u][x]k, and there exists a faulty node w that sent a set Kw,k 6⊇
(Fv,0 ∪ {v}). We consider the following cases
– In phase 0.1, all non-faulty nodes reliably received all input values : In this case,
Fx,0 = V − {x} for all non-faulty nodes x, as argued in the base case. Since
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Fv,0 ∪ {v} = V , therefore, by the induction hypothesis, Kx,k ⊇ V for all non-
faulty nodes x. Furthermore, since |F ∗u,k+1| < f , the set Fu is not updated in the
first k + 1 rounds of phase 2. Hence Fu,k = Fu,0 = V − {u}. Hence, if node u
reliably receives a set Kw,k 6⊇ V , u sets K[u][w] = V . Therefore for all nodes x,
K[u][x]k = V . Therefore,
Ku,k+1 = ∩xK[u][x] (4.1)
= ∩xV (4.2)
= V (4.3)
= Fv,0 ∪ {v} (4.4)
– After phase 0.1 there exists nodes a non-faulty node x and faulty node y such that
valx[y] = ⊥ : This is not possible as discussed in the base case.
– After phase 0.1, there exist nodes x and y, such that valx[y] = ⊥ : By the
induction hypothesis, W ⊆ Fv,k and F ∗v,k ⊆ W . Hence, by Corollary 4.7, node
v reliably receives Kw,k in round k + 1. But, since Kw,k 6⊇ (Fv,k ∪ {v}), in round
k+1 of phase 2.1, v adds the faulty node w to the set F ∗v . By Lemma 4.9, at the
end of phase 0.2, y knows the actual set of faulty nodes, i.e. |F ∗y | = f . Therefore
in phase 1, y must have sent the message (faulty, F ∗y , []). Since v learned that
w is a faulty node, |F ∗v,k+1| ≥ 1. All updates made so far to the sets Fv and F ∗v
are correct. Hence, by Lemma 4.6, v can reliably receive messages from node




y . Since, |F ∗y | = f ,
|F ∗v,k+1| = f . Therefore v is not a participating node in round k + 2 of phase 2,
which is a contradiction.
Corollary 4.13. Let u be an arbitrary non-faulty node. Then u reliably receives any message
sent by a faulty node, w. Furthermore, if |F ∗u | ≥ 1 or |Fu| < 2f , then u reliably receives
messages from every node x ∈ V .
Proof. This follows from Lemma 4.12 and Lemma 4.6.
Lemma 4.14. Let u, v be non-faulty nodes, such that valu[v] = ⊥ at the end of phase 0.1.
If there is a round 1 ≤ r ≤ n of phase 2 in which the number of participating nodes does not
decrease, then the following conditions hold
• If x is a participating node in round r, then x does not receive a message
(Ksety, Ky,r−1), such that Ky,r−1 6⊇ (Fx,r ∪ {x})
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• If x is a participating node in round r, and y is any node in V , then y reliably receives
(Ksetx, Kx,r−1) in round r
Proof. We prove both claims below.
• Suppose that in round r of phase 2.1, a non-faulty node x receives a set Kw,r−1 6⊇
(Fx,r ∪ {x}). Note that by Lemma 4.8, node v knows the identity of all the faulty
nodes by the end of phase 0. Hence, v must have sent (faulty, F ∗v ) in phase 1. Since,
node x receives a set Kw 6⊇ (Fx,r ∪ {x}) in round r of phase 2, x sets F ∗x = F ∗x ∪ {w}.
Since |F ∗x | ≥ 1, by Corollary 4.13, x can reliably receive messages from every node.




v . Since |F ∗v | = f , therefore, |F ∗x,r| = f .
Therefore, by definition, node x is not a participating node in round r + 1. However,
by assumption, the number of participating nodes does not decrease in round r. So
this is impossible.
• Suppose that in round r of phase 2.1, a participating node x sends a message m, and
m is not reliably received by a node y. Then in phase 2.2, x learns the identity of
the faulty nodes, i.e. |F ∗x | = f (the argument is identical to Lemma 4.8). Therefore,
x is not a participating node in round r + 1. Again, by assumption, the number of
participating nodes does not decrease in round r. So this is impossible.
Lemma 4.15. Let u, v be non-faulty nodes, such that valu[v] = ⊥ at the end of phase 0.1,
then in the decision phase, for any pair of non-faulty nodes x, y, we have Dx = Dy = D (for
some set D ⊆ V ). Furthermore, we have, |D| ≥ 2f + 1.
Proof. Consider an arbitrary non-faulty node x. If there is no participating node in a round
n + 1 of phase 2, then it must be the case that |F ∗x,n| = f and Fx,n = F ∗x,n. Therefore in
round n of phase 2.3, x sets Kx,n = V . Consider the decision phase. By Corollary 4.13, x
reliably receives messages from every node in the decision phase. Hence, x computes
Dx = ∩y/∈FxK[x][y] (4.5)





By assumption the graph G has at least 2f + 1 nodes. Hence, |Dx| ≥ 2f + 1.
Now let us suppose that there is at least one participating node in round n + 1 of
phase 2. Since there are n rounds of phase 2, if the number of participating node decreases
in every round, then there would be no participating nodes in round n+1 of phase 2. Since
we are assuming that there is at least one participating node in round n + 1 of phase 2,
there must be a round 1 ≤ r ≤ n, in which the number of participating nodes stays the
same.
Let x and x′ be participating nodes in round r of phase 2. We will show that Kx,r = Kx′,r,
by showing that K[x][y] = K[x′][y] for all nodes y. For any node y, there are three possible
cases.
• Node y is a faulty node : In this case, by Corollary 4.13, every non-faulty node
reliably receives Ky,r−1. By Lemma 4.14, Ky,r−1 ⊇ (Fz ∪ {z}) for all nodes z that are
participating in round r of phase 2. Hence, we have K[x][y] = K[x′][y] = Ky,r−1.
• Node y is a participating node in round r of phase 2 : By Lemma 4.14, every par-
ticipating node in round r of phase 2 reliably receives Ky,r−1. By Lemma 4.12,
Ky,r−1 ⊇ (Fz ∪ {z}) for all participating nodes z in phase 2. Hence, we have
K[x][y] = K[x′][y] = Ky,r−1.
• Node y is a non-faulty node that is not participating in round r of phase 2 : In this
case, node y does not send any message with the tag Ksety. Therefore, no non-faulty
node z reliably receives any message with the tag Ksety. By the update rules in phase
2, we have K[x][y] = K[x′][y] = V .
Then,
Kx,r = ∩y∈VK[x][y]r (4.10)
= ∩y∈VK[x′][y]r (Because K[x][y]r = K[x′][y]r) (4.11)
= Kx′,r (4.12)
Therefore, Kx,r = Kx′,r.
Now consider round r + 1 of phase 2. We will show that for any nodes x, x′ that remain
participating nodes in round r + 2 of phase 2, we have Kx,r+1 = Kx′,r+1. For any node y,
there are again three cases.
• Node y is a faulty node : In this case, byCorollary 4.13, every non-faulty node reliably
receives Ky,r. Since nodes x and x
′ remain participating nodes in round r+2 of phase
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2, it must be the case that Ky,r ⊇ (Fx,r ∪ {x}) and Ky,r ⊇ (Fx′,r ∪ {x′}). Hence, by
the update rules in phase 2, K[x][y] = K[x′][y] = Ky,r.
• Node y is a participating node : In this case, Ky,r = Kx,r = Kx′,r, as argued earlier.
Nodes x and x′ either reliably receive Ky,r they do not. In either case, K[x][y]r ⊇ Kx,r
and K[x′][y]r ⊇ Kx′,r.
• Node y is a non-faulty node that is not participating in round r of phase 2 : As argued
earlier, in this case K[x][y]r = K[x
′][y]r = V .
And, we have
Kx,r+1 = ∩y∈VK[x][y]r+1 (4.13)
= Kx,r ∩y∈W K[x][y]r (for y /∈ W , K[x][y]r ⊇ Kx,r) (4.14)
= Kx′,r ∩y∈W K[x][y]r (Kx,r = Kx′,r) (4.15)
= Kx′,r ∩y∈W K[x′][y]r (for y ∈ W , K[x][y]r = K[x′][y]r) (4.16)
= Kx′,r+1 (4.17)
We can now repeat this argument inductively, and say that for all nodes x, x′ that are
participating in round n+ 1 of phase 2, Kx,n = Kx′,n = K (for some set K ⊆ V ).
By Lemma 4.12, K ⊇ (Fx,0 ∪{x}). By Lemma 4.10, |Fx,0| = 2f . Therefore, |K| ≥ 2f +1.
For a node z, if Kz = K in the decision phase, then whether or not z reliably receives any
other message or not, z computes K as the decision set Dz. Otherwise if Kz 6= K, it must
be the case that z was not a participating node in round n+1 of phase 2. Hence, |Fz,n| = f
and Kz,n = V . Furthermore by Corollary 4.13, z can reliably receive messages from every
node. Therefore, z reliably receives K in the decision phase from some node x′ /∈ Fx and
computes Dz = K.
Theorem 4.16. The algorithm described in 4.1 correctly achieves consensus.
Proof. Termination is trivially satisfied, since the algorithm runs a bounded number of steps.
For validity and agreement, we consider two cases.
• There exist non-faulty nodes u, v such that u does not reliably receive the input value of
v in phase 0.1 : In this case, at the end of phase 0.1, we have, valu[v] = ⊥. Hence, by
Lemma 4.15, all non-faulty nodes compute the same decision set D, and |D| ≥ 2f+1.
• For all non-faulty nodes u, v, node u reliably receives the input value of node v : Con-
sider an arbitrary node z. There are two cases.
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– Node z is a participating node in round n+1 of phase 2 : Since all nodes reliably
receive all values in phase 0.1, we haveKz,0 = V . Now we will show Fz,n = V −{z}
and Kz,n = V . Note that the set Fz is only updated in phase 0, if either z does not
reliably receive an input value, or the size of F ∗z becomes f . Since, by assumption,
all nodes reliably receive all input values in phase 0.1, and z is a participating
node in round n+1 of phase 2, neither of the these conditions is true. Therefore,
the set Fz is not updated in phase 0. Furthermore, the set Fz is only updated in
phase 1, or phase 2, if the size of the set F ∗z becomes f . Since z is a participating
node in round n+1, by definition, we have |F ∗z.n| < f . Therefore, the set Fz is not
updated in phase 1, and in any round of phase 2. Hence, Fz,n = V . Now since
z is a participating node in round n + 1 of phase 2, in any round r, if z reliably
received a message (Ksety, Ky,r−1), then by Lemma 4.14, it must be the case
that Ky,r−1 ⊇ Fz,r ∪ {z} = V . Hence, Kz,r = V , for all rounds r. In particular,
we have, Kz,n = V .
In the decision phase, node z computes
Dz = ∩y/∈Fz,nK[z][y]n (4.18)
= ∩y∈{z}K[z][y]n (Because Fz,n = V − {z}) (4.19)
= K[z][z]n (4.20)
= V (As argued earlier) (4.21)
– Node z is not a participating node in round n + 1 of phase 2 : If z is not a
participating node in round n + 1 of phase 2, then it must be the case that
|F ∗z,n| = f , and hence by Corollary 4.13, z reliably receives messages from every
node and sets Kz,n = V in phase 2.3 of round n of phase 2.
Therefore, for every non faulty node z, we have Kz = V in the decision set, and hence,
every node computes V as the decision set.
So in every execution of the algorithm, all nodes compute the same decision set D, and
|D| ≥ 2f + 1.
Now if x is any node in V , and valu[x] 6= ⊥ and valv[x] 6= ⊥, then this must mean that u
and v both reliably receive the input value of x. Hence, valu[x] = valv[x] = valx[x], and
every node computes the same multiset S = {valv[v] | v ∈ D}. Since S contains 2f + 1
values, the majority value in S has to be the value of a non-faulty node, so the algorithm
satisfies validity. Since every node computes the decision using the same steps, agreement is
satisfied too.
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We showed that Byzantine consensus is achievable under our model on any arbitrary graph
that is 2f -connected, and has at least 2f +1 nodes. The algorithm presented in this chapter
can also be used for the case of a single fault, but we mention both algorithms separately,
as we think they illustrate different techniques to tackle the problem.
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Chapter 5: Other Results
In this chapter we present two other results without proof. Our first claim is a necessity
claim about the connectivity of the underlying communication graph.
Claim 5.1. Let G = (V,E) be any arbitrary undirected graph that is at most b3f
2
c-connected.
Then there exists no algorithm for achieving consensus on graph G, under the presence of f
faulty nodes.
We believe that an argument similar to the proof of Lemma 2.3 can be made for this
claim as well. Our next claim says that for even numbers f , there exists a graph with
connectivity 3f
2
+ 1, on which consensus is achievable.
Claim 5.2. Let G1 = G2 = Kf/2, and G3 = K3f/2+1, where Kn is the complete graph on n
nodes. Define G to be the union of G1, G2, G3 with additional edges between every pair of
nodes in G1 and G3, and every pair of nodes in G2 and G3. We claim that there exists an




Figure 5.1: (3f/2 + 1)-connected graph G
The graph G in the above claim is shown in Figure 5.1. Each block represents one of the
cliques G1, G2, G3, and an edge between two blocks represents an edge between every pair
of nodes in the two subgraphs.
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Chapter 6: Conclusion
We studied the problem of exact consensus in directed and undirected graphs with local-
broadcast channels, under the presence of Byzantine faults nodes. We proved conditions
on the degree and connectivity of the graphs under which consensus is impossible. We also
showed two different algorithms for solving consensus under the presence of f Byzantine
faulty nodes. Both algorithms illustrate different algorithmic and proof techniques for at-
tacking the problem of consensus. We show that under our model, binary-valued consensus
is achievable on any graph that is 2f -connected, and that no algorithm exists for achieving
consensus on a graph that is at most f -connected. In contrast, under the point-to-point
model even binary-valued consensus is impossible on any graph with connectivity less than
2f +1 or nodes less than 3f +1. We also show that under our model consensus is impossible
on any graph in which the minimum node degree is less than 2f . We believe that there exist
graphs with connectivity at most b3f
2
c + 1 on which binary-valued consensus is achievable.
However, the following problems remain open.
Problem 6.1. Does there exist an algorithm for achieving binary-valued consensus on an
arbitrary graph that is (b3f
2
c+ 1)-connected and has minimum degree 2f .
Problem 6.2. Does there exist an algorithm for achieving multi-valued consensus on arbi-
trary graph with connectivity 2f .
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